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REPORT OF THE COUNTERTRADE CONSULTATIVE MEETING
INTRODUCTION
1. This report summarises the presentations and discussions of 
a Countertrade .Consultative Meeting held at the Headquarters of 
the Caribbean Community Secretariat (CARICOM), Central Bank 
Building, Georgetown, Guyana, from the 14 to 15 March 1989.
2. The technical meeting was çpnvened jointly by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(UN/ECLAC) and the Caribbean Community Secretariat (CARICOM).
Opening session
3. The featured address was delivered by the Hon. Mr. Winston 
Murray, Minister of Trade and Tourism, Government of Guyana. Other 
addresses were given by Ms. Cecile Davis, Resident Representative, 
United Nations Development Programme, Guyana and Ms. Desiree Field- 
Ridley, Economic Adviser, CARICOM Secretariat. Ms. Field-Ridley 
spoke on behalf of the Secretary-General of CARICOM, Mr. Roderick 
Rainford. The text of the address of the Minister of Trade and 
Tourism is contained in Annex 1 of this report. Mr. Stan Odle, 
Trade Programme Co-ordinator, CARICOM Secretariat presided over the 
meeting.
Purpose of the meeting
4. The purpose of the meeting was to consider various forms of 
countertrade and their applicability and viability to the external 
trade of the Caribbean. In this regard, the meeting was called to 
examine the various arguments for and against countertrade and the 
possibility of establishing a regional facility for it in the 
region. The meeting was also called to consider co-operation
amongst state trading organizations in the English-speaking
Caribbean countries in general arçd countertrade in particular.
Participants
5. Representatives from the following Governments were invited 
to the meeting: Barbados, Cuba, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and
Trinidad and Tobago. In addition, there were representatives from 
the private sector and jfrom regional and international 
organizations. The list of participants is contained in Annex II.
Structure of the meeting
t6. The Agenda of the meeting! is outlined at Annex III and the 




7. The Chairman, Mr. Stan Odle,s welcomed the Minister of Trade 
and Tourism of the Government of Guyana and participants to the 
meeting. He briefly explained the purpose of the meeting and asked 
participants to introduce themselves. At the end of this, Ms. 
Desire Field-Ridley, Economic Adviser from CARICOM, and Ms. Cecile 
Davis, Resident Representative of UNDP, made opening statements.
The featured address was given by the Minister of Trade and 
Tourism, The Hon. Winston Murray.
8. The economic adviser spoke on behalf of the Secretary-General 
of CARICOM. She extended a warm welcome to the Minister of Trade 
and Tourism, Mr. W. Murray, to participants and to ECLAC, without 
whose interest in the subject, she noted, there would not have been 
the collaborative arrangement between the two secretariats to hold 
the consultative meeting. She referred to efforts by CARICOM at 
regional meetings to assess the pros and cons and scope of 
countertrade. She also took note of the experience of countries 
in the region in the trade. The CARICOM Secretariat, she added, 
was pleased to host the meeting for a variety of reasons amongst 
which was the fact that a number of CARICOM States were engaged in 
countertrade in order to facilitate both import and export 
transactions.
9. Countertrade, she observed, was practiced on a trial and error 
basis with varying degrees of success. Since countertrade could 
result in increased interregional trade, there was need for further 
study and refinement, even to the extent of giving greater 
flexibility to the trade to overcome some of its limitations. 
Countertrade could result not only in increases in trade but also 
in reductions in trading imbalances, thereby providing a possible 
solution to a viable CARICOM Multilateral Clearing House Facility. 
The economic adviser from CARICOM referred to the production side 
of countertrade and the economic benefits that it conferred. She 
made mention of a number of organizational arrangements that needed 
to be put in place for countertrade to be operationalized.
10. The speaker then said that it was CARICOM's hope that the 
meeting would be more that just a recounting of experiences. The 
expectation, she added, was that it would be a meeting that could 
point the way for Member States on what directions to take on 
countertrade. She further hoped that the meeting would not leave 
issues unresolved. She observed that participants were starting 
out on the discussions knowing that direct sales were always i 
preferable to countertrade. Noting the costs of countertrade, 
which she said had a tendency to escalate, she added that what was 
needed was a mechanism to reduce costs and maximize benefits.
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11. The representative of CARICOM noted the importance of the 
subsidiary subject on co-operation among state trading 
organizations and indicated that it could be the subject of 
discussions on its own merit. She concluded on a hopeful note that 
the meeting would be a success.
12. The next speaker was the Resident Representative, United 
Nations Development Programme, Guyana who spoke on behalf of ECLAC. 
In her statement, she thanked the government of Guyana for its kind 
permission in allowing the joint 'meeting to be held. She thanked 
CARICOM, particularly the Secretary-General, Mr. Roderick Rainford, 
and Mr. Stanley Odle for all that they had done in facilitating the 
holding of the meeting. j She welcomed all participants and 
expressed confidence that thèir knowledge and experience would be 
useful to the business of the meeting.
13. The Resident Representative noted the economic circumstances 
in the region in which the meeting was being held - declining 
growth rates, increases in the levels, and rates of unemployment, 
debt, inflation and a foreign * exchange constraint. Alternative 
trade tools had to be developed. Countertrade was one such tool. 
She referred to the ECLAC/UNCTC Group of Experts Meeting on Trade 
Finance, Transnational Banks and External Finance held 17-19 May 
1988 in Barbados which referred to the usefulness of countertrade 
but noted the high cost of transactions.
14. The speaker noted the arrangements for holding the 
consultative meeting summarizing the main elements of the two 
documents: "Countertrade policies and practices with special 
reference to selected Caribbean countries" and "Co-operation among 
state trading organizations". The former was a factual 
presentation of countertrade as contained in the economic literature on the subject and a treatment of government policy and 
practices, together with the activities of international trading 
firms and financial intermediaries. The document ended with an 
examination of the issue of a regional facility for countertrade. 
The second document focused on the role of state trading 
corporations in fostering economic co-operation in the region. The 
author considered questions of joint procurement and purchasing, 
marketing, trade information, export development, shipping and air 
transportation. She then referred to recommendation No. 2, in that 
document in which regional governments were urged to investigate 
the possibility of setting up joint marketing services in overseas 
markets for products such as bauxite, alumina, bananas, sugar, 
spices as well as non-traditional agricult irai, agro-based and 
manufactured products.
15. Finally, she wished for a good meeting and expressed the hope 
that the recommendations that would emerge would be useful to 
Caribbean governments.
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16. The featured address was delivered by the Hon. Winston Murray, 
Minister of Trade and Tourism, Government of Guyana. The Minister 
congratulated CARICOM and ECLAC for sponsoring the consultative 
meeting. He suggested that there might be other areas of economic 
and functional activities which could benefit from the consultative 
process to the good of countries in the region. He hoped that the 
regional and international organizations present would be willing 
to assist in financing consultations under regional programmes by 
enlarging their resource allocations to the region. Turning to the 
countertrade meeting, he noted that it was timely both for 
political and technical reasons. On countertrade itself, the 
Minister further noted that it was one mechanism through which 
goods might be sold, although normal commercial arrangements were 
more efficient for conducting external trade transactions.i
17. Minister Murray expressed satisfaction with the documentation 
for the meeting. He indicated that the consultation would have 
been worthwhile even if, at the end, the only common position that 
was to emerge was that countertrade could have a useful role to 
play as the Caribbean region strove to promote exports to third 
countries and expand intrarégional trade. The full text of the 
Minister's statement is contained in Annex I.
Countertrade policies and practices with special 
reference to selected Caribbean countries
18. After the Minister's statement, the Chairman asked Mr. St. 
George Joiner of UN/ECLAC secretariat to present the main document 
of the meeting - "Countertrade policies and practices with special 
reference to selected Caribbean countries". (LC/CAR/G. 267).
19. He started by referring to missions that he had undertaken 
and the research he had done for the purpose of writing the 
document. He defined countertrade as "an international commercial 
operation in the framework of which the seller has to accept in 
partial or in total settlement|of his delivery in the supply of 
products coming from the purchasing country." He then gave a 
brief economic history of the evolution of countertrade in 
international economic relations starting from ancient times 
through the Great Depression, to the oil crisis of 1973. The year 
1973 saw many nations, botljr developed and developing, resorting to 
the practice of countertrade. The industrialized countries sought 
deals that ensured supplies of oil for them whilst developing 
countries concluded ones at prices that were slightly below the 
then high world market prices.
20. Following that brief historical sketch was a presentation of 
the data on countertrade as contained in document LC/CAR/G.267. 
Information was given on a number of deals covering the period
1 OECD East-West Trade: Recent development in countertrade^'
(Paris, 1981) p.9.
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1980-1987 for North Africa, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the Indian sub-continent, East Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Data on products countertraded were also given, with 
special mention made of the data on crude.oil and cereals. Further 
graphic presentations were given on reported deals involving 
developing countries and on exports from developing countries in 
1,122 deals struck between 1980-1987.
21. The reasons for countertrade were then examined. Mr. Joiner 
looked at three groups of countries:
a) Developed market-economy countries;
b) The socialist countries of Eastern Europe and China; and
c) The developing countries.
22. For the first group he noted the following reasons for 
countertrade: the need to pursue industrial policy objectives; to 
have access to the supply of critical raw materials; to undertake 
nominal pricing arrangements, to reduce debt incurred by third 
world nations; and to expand business opportunities. Examples 
illustrating these were given.
23. The reasons for countertrade by the second group of countries 
were outlined. These related to the need to maintain foreign trade 
policy as part of general macro-economic management, to the 
requirement to upgrade technology, to penetrate non-traditional 
markets and international marketing networks and to establish a 
means for earning and conserving foreign exchange.
24. For developing countries, Mr. Joiner stated that they 
undertook countertrade in order to: overcome critical foreign 
exchange constraints, to improve their marketing intelligence and 
develop new markets for their non-traditional products and dispose 
of excess supplies of commodities via incremental markets, to 
obtain modern technology; and to 'engage, albeit discreetly, in 
exchange rate management techniques through the use of selective 
devaluations on countertrade deals. •
25. In presenting the case against countertrade, he indicated that 
the trade was complicated and risky. Deals have had to be tailor- 
made, regulations governing them were often cumbersome and the 
approval processes were unpredictable. He identified costs as the 
second prohibitive factor. Those costs related to subsidies or 
discounts to be passed on to the ultimate buyer and to commissions 
of between 1-5 percent of the value of deals. Administrative and 
legal costs were also identified. Added to them were hidden costs 
relating to uncertainties about the delivery of goods, the quality 
of products countertraded and economy-wide distortions brought 
about by discounts on deals. All these, he said, made countertrade 
expensive.
26. In addition to the above, reference was made to the fact that 
countertrade tended to limit the incentives for autonomous 
marketing by state trading organizations which relied on deals 
rather than on initiative to stay in business. Finally, there were 
considerations that the International Monetary Fund and the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) were not supportive of the 
trade. The IMF believed that the objective of countertrade could 
be achieved efficiently through appropriate fiscal, monetary and 
exchange rate policies. Whilst GATT rules did not mention 
countertrade, interpretations of them, the speaker noted, formed 
the basis of arguments against countertrade. Articles XI, XVIII 
and XXIII were usually cited. .
27. The presentation then focused on forms of countertrade. 
Definitions and examples of the following were given: barter, 
counterpurchase, compensation (buy-back), offsets, joint ventures, 
evidence accounts and switch-trading. Diagrams were used to 
illustrate each form. After that, the policies and practices of 
selected Caribbean countries were evaluated.
28. Jamaica was the first country to be reviewed. That country 
had a countertrade committee to which all deals were submitted. 
No specific legislation governed the trade but a number of criteria 
had to be satisfied. These ranged from a requirement that deals 
generated new exports to the fact that they must also bring in new 
investment. Products countertraded had been bauxite, alumina, 
tobacco, gypsum, soya beans and off-season tourism. The United 
States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia and 
China have been countries with which countertrade deals had been 
concluded.
29. The next country to be reviewed was Guyana. It was noted that 
a countertrade committee existed in that country. The guidelines 
by which the trade had been conducted were in the process of being 
reviewed. Indeed, Government policy on the trade was undergoing 
significant changes. One of them was that Government was now 
emphasising investment and direct market sales in preference to 
countertrade. Information was given on the volume and value of 
countertrade in Guyana. Government had used barters, buy-backs, 
counterpurchase and government-^p-govèrnment arrangements to effect 
deals. Principal countries with which Guyana did business in 
countertrade were given as Cuba, the USSR, the German Democratic 
Republic, Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago.
30. Mr. Joiner looked at the experience of Suriname. That country 
did not have a countertrade committee. Its main reason for going 
into countertrade was the sudden suspension of Dutch aid in 1982 
and the foreign exchange crisis that ensued. The practice of 
countertrade was based on the Foreign Exchange Law of 1947. There 
were three basic principles on which the trade was conducted - non- 
traditional exports would be favoured, goods imported must be
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•'basic” goods, and where traditional exports were used, they must have an incremental value to direct market sales. Information was 
given on two major deals - one for rice and the other for wood. The two countries involved in those deals were Italy and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, respectively.
31. The review on Barbados was brief. Countertrade, it was 
noted, was not an important trade policy tool in that country. 
Barbados' economy faired much better than most others in the region 
and government had in place trade finance institutions that had 
worked successfully. Nonetheless, thpre were some private sector 
deals such as one involving Stokes and Bynoe Ltd. and the Guyana 
Pharmaceutical Corporation.
32. The last country that was considered was Trinidad and Tobago. 
A brief history of the evolution of countertrade was given. A 
countetrade committee did not exist but a number of general policy 
guidelines that reflected governments' concerns were examined. 
They ranged from the need for flexibility in the application of 
regulations once developed to the establishment of an inter­
ministerial committee to prepare a comprehensive national policy 
on the trade. Examples of deals with Venezuela, Guyana and the 
United States were given.
33. The final presentation was on the possibility of the setting 
up of a regional facility for countertrade in the Caribbean. The 
speaker first looked at proposals for a similar facility to be 
established in Singapore and in Miami, Florida, USA. A feasibility 
study for an international currency and barter exchange had been 
completed by the Singapore Trade Development Board, whilst the 
International Countertrade and Currency Exchange facility in Miami 
awaited plans for its capitalization from the City of Miami.
34. A number of arguments for and against setting up a regional 
facility for the Caribbean were outlined. The case for a facility 
rested on the fact that it might provide heavily indebted countries 
in the region with a financing facility to service their trade. 
It would also create a "pool1' that would facilitate debt/commodity 
swaps. The facility would help promote^intraregional trade, permit 
trade to take place even when foreign exchange was scarce, bring 
exporters and importers closer together, enhance the region's 
position as a major trading area and foster closer economic ties
between CARICOM and non-CARICOM countries in the wider Caribbean.u
35. The foremost argument against a regional facility was that of 
cost. Member States in the region had been experiencing severe 
economic difficulties and no single country was presently able to 
shoulder the financial responsibility of operating a regional 
facility in the manner that Trinidad and Tobago did under the old
CMCF.2 . Other costs referred to were administrative and legal. 
Furthermore, the speaker noted, arrangements for a currency 
exchange at present would not be practical, given the diverse 
financial structures in the region and the region's growing 
external debt. Finally, it was argued, the cyclical nature of the 
countertrade business did not provide sufficient justification for 
a regional facility to be established at a time when there was some 
doubt as to the long term viability of the trade.
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Co-operation among state trading organizations fSTO's)
36. The next presentation was by Mr. Smikle, Consultant. His 
paper was entitled "Co-operation.among state-trading organisations 
in the Caribbean." In his introductory remarks, he set out the 
objectives and scope of the research he had undertaken on behalf 
of ECLAC. He had set out to identify the STO ' s in the region, 
determine the extent of co-operation amongst them to facilitate 
trade and see how such co-operation resulted in a reduction in some 
elements of trading costs. The research, he added, focused on the 
English-speaking Caribbean. He also adopted a working definition 
of STO's i.e. state organisations that were engaged in direct 
imports and/or exports and in export development and promotion. 
Five broad categories of STO's were identified:-
a) State Trading Corporations and Agencies;
b) Marketing Boards;
c) Export Trading and Manufacturing Companies;
d) Export Development and Promotion Corporations; and
e) National Airlines.
37. The consultant then gave examples of each of these organ­
isations/enterprises. On STO's and agencies, he discussed the 
workings of the Jamaica Commodity Trading Corporation (JCTC). That 
body, he noted, was established in 1981. Since 1982, it has been 
engaged in countertrade. The main commodities traded had been 
bauxite, motor vehicles, skimmed milk powder, butter oil and wheat. 
He also discussed the operation^) of the Guyana National Trading 
Corporation (GNTC). Founded in Í970, GNTC was responsible for the 
importation and distribution of a wide range of goods and services 
including fertilizers, hardware supplies, cement, salt, spare 
parts, gas cylinders, sporting goods, books and stationery.
38. The consultant referred to the operation of several marketing 
boards in the region, notably the Barbados Marketing Corporation, 
the Dominica Export Import Agency (DEXIA), the St. Vincent
8
2 Caribbean Multilateral Clearing Facility.
9
. Marketing Co-operative and the Central Marketing Corporation of 
Antigua. The marketing boards in the region were established in 
colonial times and their responsibilities had been mainly in the 
marketing of traditional exports. In some instances, specialised 
marketing organizations had been set up to deal with specific 
commodities. Examples cited were WINBAN (which handled banana 
exports for the Windward Islands), JAMCO (which handled Jamaica's 
banana exports) and BATCO (which handled bauxite and alumina sales 
for Jamaica).
39. Turning to export trading andwmanufacturing companies, the 
consultant looked ..at JETCO, the Jamaica Export Trading Company 
established in 1972. That Company marketed a wide range of non- 
traditional products including garments, straw products, furniture, 
industrial minerals, processed foods, citrus and other fresh 
agricultural produce. The company used agents and distributors to 
market its products in the USA, Canada and Western Europe. 
Reference was also made to the Trinidad and Tobago Export Trading 
Company which was established as a subsidary of the Trinidad and 
Tobago Export Development Corporation to market new products and 
to secure new markets.
40. The above corporation, together with the Jamaica National 
Export Corporation (JNEC), and the Barbados Export Promotion 
Corporation (BEPC), were examined by the consultant under the 
subject of export development corporations. The Trinidad and 
Tobago body was set up in 1984. It was given overall 
responsibility for export development. That responsibility 
included product analysis, desk market research, trade information 
processing, market selection, certification and field research. 
It provided incentives for exports such as market development 
grants, tax deductible promotional expenses and export allowances. 
The JNEC was established in 1969 and performed a wide range of 
activities including market research, training, export promotion 
and consultancy. It organised trade fairs and trade missions and 
published a number of journals. The BEPC mandate, the consultant 
noted, was to encourage actual or, potential exporters to expand 
existing overseas markets and to expand and develop new ones. The 
bulk of BEPC's activities was concentrated on the provision of 
services and advice to the private sector.
41. In the last category of STO's, national and regional airlines 
(BWIA, Air Jamaica, Guyana Airways and LIAT) were examined. Mr. 
Smikle discussed the provision éf both passenger and cargo services 
and linked the development of a profitable non-traditional export 
sector with an efficient air transport system.
42. The consultant's presentation then focused on co-operation 
among the STO's in the region. He observed that there were 
numerous similarities amongst them which provided a good basis for 
co-operation. The benefits from co-operation lay not so much in 
the sale of commodities as in transportation, handling and
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processing, marketing and distribution. Data was given on selected 
exports and imports by STO's. ¡The consultant, noting that co­
operation by STO's had been discussed for some time, identified 
specific areas in shipping, joint purchasing, marketing, trade 
information and export promotion and air transportation for 
attention.
43. On shipping, it was noted that the bulk of Caribbean imports 
and exports was handled by shipping companies in North America and 
Europe. He discussed the ownership and operation of the West 
Indies Shipping Corporation (WISCO). In the transportation of 
general cargo, WISCO accounted for less than 5 percent since it 
only operated in the short sea segment of Caribbean trade flows 
which amounted to 50 percent of the total trade flows of the 
region. Countries could further co-operate in that area to enhance 
the region’s share in the movement of goods. Other areas of co­
operation were identified as joint operation of terminals, storage 
depots, trans-shipment services and joint ventures to operate bulk 
carriers. Port Authorities could co-operate in the harmonization 
of rate structures and the rationalization of existing port
facilities. Shippers councils could work together to press for the 
co-ordination of shipping services by conference lines serving the 
region. They could also set up joint freight investigating units 
to monitor the cost of shipping services to the region.
44. Looking at joint purchasing, the consultant said that he found 
no evidence of STO's in the region co-operating in purchasing goods 
from third countries. That was an area with considerable potential 
and needed to be explored. Joint large volume purchases,
particularly of agricultural imports (fertilizers, chemicals, 
equipment) would result in lower production costs of agricultural 
commodities and hence place the exporting STO’s in a more
competitive position in export markets. Difficulties that would 
limit co-operation included differences in the size of the
territories, the distances between some of them, differences in 
volume of imports and exports and differences in trading practices.
45. With respect to co-operation in marketing, the speaker noted 
that the bulk of the region's exports were marketed through 
overseas agents. He advocated the consideration by governments of 
the setting up of joint overseas marketing facilities. He thought 
that the establishment of CÀTC0, the Caribbean Agricultural Trading 
Company, as a subsidiary of the Caribbean Food Corporation was a 
start in the right direction.
46. On trade information and export promotion, the consultant 
considered a number of topics: trade information, trade fairs and 
expositions, special publications, training and the CARCIOM common 
external tariff system. He emphasized the benefits of sharing 
trade information and data and gave useful information on the trade 
information system of the Jamaica National Export Corporation and 
the Trinidad and Tobago Export Development Corporation. The*
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consultant further underlined the benefits of organizing joint promotional activities at trade fairs and expositions. He felt 
that Jamaica's JNEC's special publication - Security Manual on 
Export - could be circulated throughout the region. Training on 
various aspects of export practice could be shared and co-operation 
in the setting up of a common external tariff on extraregional 
imports furthered.
47. The final area for consideration was air transport. Mr. 
Smikle observed that the existing fiational and subregional airlines 
did not offer full cargo services, a factor which very often 
elicited complaints from regional governments. With diversification 
of the economies of the region, there was the likelihood of an 
increase in the demand for air cargo transportation which the 
regional airlines should work together to satisfy.
48. In reviewing his findings and conclusions, the consultant 
brought out some of the salient points of the study. In his 
recommendation, he called for the establishment of a joint venture 
trading organization with the objective of carrying out joint 
purchasing of leading import items. He also called for regional 
governments to investigate the possibility of undertaking joint 
investments in marketing services in overseas markets. The 
consultant recommended that regional governments pursue increased 
participation in the liner and bulk trades and examine co-operation 
prospects in the joint operation of container terminals, storage 
depots and trans-shipment services and joint purchasing of tugs for 
short-sea operations. On air transportation, he recommended that 
the airlines of the region examine the feasibility of joint 
ownership and operation of full air cargo services to increase 
existing capacities and meet projected demand. In his final 
recommendation, the consultant urged STO's in the Eastern Caribbean 
to take steps to make use of existing trade information systems in 
other regional countries. He saw the project, CARTIS, the 
Caribbean Trade Information System, as a stem in the setting up of 
a formal communication and information system on trade in the 
region.
Discussions
49. Separate discussions followed the presentation of the main 
document by the ECLAC\CDCC secretariat and the subsidiary one by 
the consultant. There was some attempt to extract elements of the 
discussion on co-operation among state trading organizations and 
link them with the general discussion on countertrade.
50. The general discussion on countertrade focused on a number of 
issues. Firstly,it was felt that, on balance, the main document 
was a good one. It contained very useful descriptive and 
analytical material which Could be the basis for critical 
examination by participants. One participant said that he would 
have liked to see some conclusions or recommendations in the paper.
•t
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It was explained to him that the paper was written purposely in 
that manner to allow the participants who were experts in the field 
to make recommendations or draw conclusions on the applicability 
and viability of countertrade in the Caribbean region. Another 
participant remarked that there was a conclusion. Countertrade was 
beneficial but risky and governments were advised to proceed 
cautiously. y
51. Another general remark was made concerning the place of 
countertrade in world trade. It was the view of some participants 
that countertrade must be seen in the larger context of world 
trade. A hypothetical question was raised as to whether 
countertrade was explanatiqn for the US$ 100 m. gap in world 
trade that appeared regularly in global trade statistics. One 
participant felt that countertrade must also be linked with general 
economic management given the importance which it had assumed for 
some countries that used it as a regular trade tool.
52. Some participants noted that Latin American and Caribbean 
countries should co-operate closely in the field of countertrade. 
They should exploit the benefits of this form of exchange that 
existed in this hemisphere and, if possible, they should 
contemplate working together as a bloc in their trade relations 
with third countries.
53. Many participants felt that countertrade was a viable and 
feasible trade finance option. They recognized that opportunities 
in the region were varied but that they needed to be exploited. 
Mechanisms for realizing that opportunities would have to be set 
up where they did not exist and refined where they did. 
Countertrading links with both East and West, where profitable, 
should be enhanced. But attempts would have to be made to 
distinguish commodities which were best suitid for countertrade 
from those that were not.
54. Other general questions raised had to do with the statistical 
problem of capturing countertrade in the national accounts, the 
notion of the "additionality*1 factor in governments' policies, the 
principle of countertrade beiftg a second best option and the many 
reasons why countries, particularly developing countries, practice 
countertrade.
55. With respect to the statistical questions, the view that 
prevailed was that large recorded deals that would have been 
approved by a central bank or a ministry of trade would be 
reflected in the statistics. However, small private sector deals 
were very difficult to trace. As a result, they represented a 
considerable "leakage" in the system of reporting trade 
information. It was noted that many governments had the principle 
of additionally as an important element in their countertrade 
policy. Some reference was made to mandated countertrade and 
whether it resulted in "additional" trade or not. In the absence
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of any evidence, it was suggested that maybe "mandated” 
countertrade, as opposed to countertrade arrangements "freely" 
entered into, did not result in additionality. But in general, the 
evidence would suggest that many countries did export more goods 
using countertrade in addition to normal direct market sales.
56. The principle of countertrade being a second best option was 
debated for quite some time. The majority of the country 
experiences would seem to have donfirmed the view that it was. 
However, one participant pointed out that her country considered 
countertrade to be an important means of maintaining trade and 
commercial links with its neighbours. The question of a second 
best option did not arise. Furthermore, she asserted that in her 
country's experience, countertrade was sometimes the only option 
available for conducting any form of commercial relations with 
other countries.
57. On the reasons why1 regional governments engaged in 
countertrade, many participants advanced a series of arguments 
which explained the policies of their respective governments. For 
Jamaica, foreign exchange consideratiohs and the need to dispose 
of excess supplies of a particular product (bauxite) were by far 
the most important. Also important was the nëed to access new 
markets, especially those in Eastern Europe. Guyana's reasons had 
to do with the severe foreign exchange constraint that the country 
was experiencing, the need to maintain supplies of essential 
commodities and the requirement to gain access to new markets in 
order to increase exports. Trinidad and Tobago's economic 
situation had changed in recent times. Countertrade had been 
pursued because of the present foreign exchange problems in the 
country, the need to improve the country's balance of trade and the 
possibilities that the trade offered for debt management. 
Suriname's reasons for countertrade had to do with the foreign 
exchange crisis brought on by the suspension of Dutch aid in 1982 
and the need for accessing ney markets, particularly those in 
neighbouring countries.
58. In terms of specific subject areas on countertrade, a number 
of observations were made. The role of banking and financial 
arrangements that supported countertrade was emphasized. The 
significance of the use of performance bonds was discussed. One 
participant questioned the need for them whilst others underscored 
their importance in different types of deals, notably barters and 
counterpurchases. The bonds were necessary so that contracts could 
be fulfilled and where force majeure prevented the delivery of 
goods, parties to the deal could be compensated. It was stressed 
that negotiators in deals must pay particular attention to the 
legal fine print in the countertrade contact. Additionally, 
central banks should have some means of exercising "supervisory" 
functions over deals in order to ensure compliance with government 
financial regulations. v
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59. A number of participants saw the need for performance bonds 
as a form of guarantee. One felt that not all countertrade deals 
involved banks. Some were government to government arrangements 
done outside the banking system. Nevertheless, some kind of 
commercial obligation was essential as was the case in normal 
direct market sales. It was felt that since bonds did not have to 
be posted in hard currency, banks3could hold other forms of assets 
as collateral.
60. The other issue that was discussed was the organisational 
aspects of countertrade. The country experiences were useful in 
that regard. The main document of the meeting gave information on 
countries that had set up a Countertrade committee, had a set of 
laws, guidelines or ministerial directives, had a centralized or 
decentralized approval process and had institutional arrangements 
in place to support the trade. Those facts were examined at some 
length. From the discussions, it was clear that Guyana and Jamaica 
had the most developed organizational system in the CARICOM region. 
Cuba's, of course, was well developed and had been for some time.
61. What emerged from the discussion also was that clear 
guidelines were necessary for the trade in order to permit 
decisions to be made as to what products could or could not be 
countertraded and the countries with which deals should be made. 
Clear administrative arrangements were also essential to avoid 
bureaucratic hindrances which might slow down approval processes 
or delay the physical movement of goods to be countertraded.
62. The discussion on country experiences provided some 
information on the products and services countertraded in the 
region. For instance, it was learnt that Guyana had a contract to 
supply Suriname with brown sugar in exchange for edible oil. The 
Dominican Republic had an agreement to supply this same country 
with white sugar in exchange for lumber. Jamaica countertraded 
products such as bauxite, gypsum, soya beans and off-season tourism 
for lada cars, trucks, agricultural equipment, prefabricated houses 
and construction material. Trinidad and Tobago countertraded steel 
and oil. .
k ' Í
63. One participant pointed out that regional governments needed 
to be cautious about the goods offered for countertrade. His 
government, he noted, had taken the view that it would desist from 
deals that simply supplied raw materials to the industrialized 
countries of the north. Government reserved the right to determine 
the products to be countertraded. Some participants argued that 
the total volume of resources available for countertrade in the 
region was small as compared to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. Therefore, they urged greater regional co-operation 
between Latin America and the Caribbean in a wider setting in order 
to profit from the opportunities of countertrade. One participant 
was worried that this push to widen the countertrade base in the
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region might result in difficulties for CARICOM countries that have 
obligations under that treaty.
64. The review of the country experiences brought out the 
necessity for an exchange of information by regional governments. 
Reliable trade information was essential in order to ensure that 
countertrade deals were drawn up in the best interest of all 
parties and that the execution of contracts was done on the basis 
of adequate and reliable information.-' It was recognized that the 
big trading houses and transnational banks that engaged in 
countertrade had access to countertrade information through data 
bases which could be easily accessed. Countries in the region that 
practiced countertrade did not have that type of access, so that 
information exchange amongst them was important. One participant 
gave a description of the Caribbean Trade Information System 
(CARTIS) and another of the Central American Trade Information 
System (PLACIEX). It was the view of some participants that these 
two systems should, in time, contain information on countertrade 
that could be accessed by regional governments.
65. Part of the discussion on state trading was linked to the 
question of information. The Export Development Corporation of 
Trinidad and Tobago and the Jamaica National Export Corporation 
had set up trade information systems that had useful data that 
could be shared in the region. The consultant had referred to this 
in his presentation and he ¡was supported by a number of 
participants. One participant felt that given the fact that 
sometimes secrecy surrounded deals, it might not always be possible 
to share information on specific deals. He recognized, however, 
that there was the need to do something to avoid the pitfalls that 
countries like Guyana and Suriname had experienced.
66. In examining the role of state trading organizations in 
countertrade, participants considered a number of points raised by 
the consultant in his presentation. < One participant felt that the 
experience of STO's should be utilized when countertrade 
arrangements were concluded. Another ’identified joint purchasing 
and procurement, marketing and transportation as areas for 
effective co-operation. Yet another participant was sceptical. 
He said that the notion that there were advantages to be gained 
from joint marketing arrangements was not entirely correct. There 
were cases where individual buyers obtained better prices for their 
products than they would otherwise have had under joint 
arrangements. Some joint arrangements, such as CATCO, were not 
always positive. As a result, the participant added, it was 
essential to carefully identify the products for joint marketing.
67. The discussion on the role of STO's in countertrade resulted 
in some differences of views on the importance of STO's in 
promoting countertrade. In the majority of regional countries, 
STO's were the dominant countertrade agency, both in the import as 
well as on the export side. That fact was'noted by a number of
participants. Nevertheless, cognizance was taken of the role of 
private traders and companies; that did countertrade.
68. Participants did not spend much time on the operations of 
trading houses and agencies that engaged in countertrade. They 
had some discussions on the objections to countertrade that were 
often raised by the IMF, the World Bank and the GATT. All 
governments that had countertrade arrangements were mindful of the 
objections of these international agencies. The point was made 
though that some of the objections were not strong enough to 
persuade countries that practised the trade to abandon it. Some 
of the country experiences revealed instances in which the trade 
was highly beneficial. Countertrade had been a useful mechanism 
that permitted normal commercial exchanges to take place.
69. The issue of a regional facility fox' countertrade took up a 
considerable amount of time. Participants reviewed the arguments 
in the main document. Questions were asked as to the nature of 
such a facility, its structure, capitalization and organization. 
Comparisons were made with the old CMCF and the difficulties that 
were experienced in operating it. I One participant was not sure as 
to what conclusions could be drawn from the chapter on the regional 
facility in the document. Another found the arguments against 
setting up a regional facility more convincing than the arguments 
for having it.
70. The most convincing argument against a x*egional facility, 
participants felt, was that it would be too costly to operate. 
The financial, legal and administrative costs could be such that 
they would make it difficult for regional governments to make 
provisions for them in national budgets at a time when most 
countries were going through difficult economic periods. Many felt 
that the experience of the CMCF would discourage central bankers 
and Ministry of Finance officials from agreeing to such a facility 
being set up. Some participants said that what could be better 
done would be the establishment of conditions that would be 
supportive of a regional approach to countertrade. There were 
others who suggested that the regional financial institutions such 
as BLADEX and the CDB covild be xiseful in that regard. The 
prevailing view was that the experience of countries that practised 
countertrade in the region was relatively recent. What was 
essential therefore was for these countries to share experiences 
and thereby profit better from the trade.
71. The discussion on countertrade was followed by a shorter 
discussion on co-operation among state trading organizations. 
Reference has already been made to parts of that discussion that 
related directly to countertrade. On other areas, participants 
raised questions about the definition of STO's as used by the 
consultant. One participant did not think national airlines could 
be correctly described as STO's. Another disagreed. He cited BWIA 
as an example. That airline, he noted, sold a service and was
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wholly owned by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago. One 
participant added the regional air cargo carrier, CARICARGO, and 
the Arawak Cement Plant to the list of STO'S. After some debate, 
it was felt that definitional problems were not very important. 
The areas of co-operation between STO'S were, and so participants 
focused on them.
72. The areas examined were tl̂ at of joint procurement and 
purchasing, shipping, and trade information and export promotion. 
Reference has already been made to statements on joint procurement 
and purchasing. On shipping, it was the view of some participants 
that the region could indeed benefit from the proposals outlined 
by the consultant. Co-operation in the setting up of freight rates 
with conference lines was particularly important as it affected the 
competitiveness of the region's exports. The points raised by the 
consutant on trade information and export promotion were also 
discussed by participants, many of whom stressed the need for the 
sharing of information by STO's.
73. After the general discussions, the meeting considered and 
adopted a number of findings and conclusions. These are contained 
in the following section.
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
74. Participants recognized that some countries have resorted to 
the mechanism of countertrade to help them achieve their 
development objectives. They noted that the specific reasons for 
using the countertrade route varied from country to country and 
included both short-term and long-term factors, such as:
(a) Limited foreign exchange availability;
(b) The need to increase and diversify exports;t
(c) The need to source the raw material inputs required 
industry;
for
(d) The acquisition of technology and capital goods;
(e) Securing marketing services as well as market access 
targetted countries;
in
(£) Liquidating existing obligations,
75. Some participants, while noting the usefulness of
countertrade, felt that direct market sales would always be 
preferred. One participant expressed the view that all forms of 
trade that benefitted a country were good.
76. The point was made that CARICOM States should fully observe 
their CARICOM obligations in the conduct of their countertrade 
activities.
77. In the discussion of their individual country experiences in 
countertrade, part.: cipants attempted to identify possible solutions 
to the problems which limited the success of their countertrade 
endeavours. The findings and conclusions emerging from these 
discussions are dealt with under the following seven subject areas:
a. Organisation k
1. Participants examined the administrative structure which 
would enable the effective management of countertrade arrangements 
at the national level and noted that a countertrade committee 
composed of representatives drawn from the public and private 
sectors, the Central Bank, export promotion agencies and related 
bodies seemed to be an effective approach.
2. They agreed that clear guidelines should be established 
to govern the conduct of countertrade (either through formal 
legislative provisions or the more informal medium of ministerial 
directives).
19
3. They examined the options of a centralised or a
decentralised arrangement and chose to emphasize the importance of 
the avoidance of bureaucratic hindrances which might frustrate the 
larger objective being pursued through the countertrade mechanism.
b. Products and.services
1. It was noted that countertrade could involve the exchange 
of raw materials, semi-manufactured' and manufactured goods and 
services. Participants felt that governments could best determine 
the products to be countertraded and the form in which they were 
traded.
2. It was recognized that there was a need to explore the
possibilities of countertrading arrangements in the services sector 
such as data entry and data processing and off-season tourism. 
Participants were mindful that where these services could be traded 
for cash there might be no need to countertrade them.
3. It was noted that the instances of countertrade among
members of the CARICOM subregion were limited in number. Increased 
efforts at exploiting the opportunities for countertrade were 
necessary. It was also noted that the opportunities for expanding 
countertrade activities in the wider Caribbean and Latin American 
region should be explored.
c. Financial and banking arrangements
1. The importance of banking and financing arrangements to 
support countertrade was stressed. It was recognised that the 
Caribbean Development Bank and BLADEX, appropriately endowed, could 
play a useful role in facilitating countertrade activities.
2. The significance of using countertrade as a means of 
reducing the debt burden of countries in the region was discussed. 
Arrangements that resulted in the use of countertrade as a means 
of reducing debts should be examined, as a viable option in the 
management of the overall debt of countries in the region.
d . Information
It was agreed that a reliabíe trade information system at the 
regional and national levels was essential to ensure effective and 
efficient countertrade operations. There was a clear advantage to 
be gained from governments with experience in countertrade sharing 
their experiences for the benefit of other states considering 
countertrade as a trading option. The importance of the trade 
information systems, CARTIS and PLACIEX, was stressed.
e. Trading houses, agents, joint marketing and purchasing by
state trading organizations v
The role of trading houses and agents was not fully discussed. 
The role of state trading organizations in the area of joint 
purchasing, marketing and shipping (freight rates, insurance) was 
also not fully examined. However, the meeting felt that STO's in 
the region needed to co-operate closely in trading matters in 
general and on countertrade in particular. The economic benefits 
of this form of co-operation were noted.
f. Attitude of certain international organizations
Participants noted that certain international organizations, 
notably the IMF, World Bank and the GATT were not favourably 
disposed to the use of the cóuntertrade mechanism on grounds that 
it distorted international trade and encouraged the maintenance of 
inappropirate exchange rates. However, participants recognized 
that certain countries in the region practised the trade on a 
regular basis and have derived substantial benefits from it.
g . Regional collaboration in countertrade
1. Participants discussed at some length the possible scope 
for a regional countertrade facility. Among the questions which 
arose in the discussion was the form regional collaboration might 
take (including the extent of participation), how any such regional 
arrangement might be implemented and, more fundamentally, whether 
any formal regional structure was necessary.
2. Participants felt that at this stage, there was a more
critical need for the regular exchange of information and 
experience between countertrade entities so as to avoid repeats of 
some of the negative experiences or outright bad countertrade deals 




Opening session of consultative meeting
on
Countertrade Policie-ft and Practices 
14 March 1989
Statement by W. Murray. Minister of Trade and Tourism
Mr. Chairman, Secretary- General of CARICOM, members of the 
Diplomatic Corps, distinguished representatives of international 
organizations, participants to consultative meeting, special 
invitees, it would be appropriate for me to congratulate the 
officials of the Caribbean Subregional Headquarters of ECLAC and 
the CARICOM Secretariat officials for sponsoring this consultative 
meeting. Permit me also the liberty of suggesting that there may 
be many other areas of economic and functional activities which 
could benefit from the consultative process to the good of the 
countries of the region. May I, therefore, express the hope that 
regional organi ?.at.ions would themselves use the consultative 
process for identifying other topics which may be the subject of 
other consultative meetings in the future. I am aware that, in the 
prevailing economic circumstances, budgetary considerations may be 
a constraining factor. In this regard I hope I am not mistaken in 
the belief that the regional and international organizations here 
present would be willing to assist in financing such consultations 
under regional programmes by enlarging upon the resource 
allocations to the region.
Mr. Chairman, the specific consultations which will be taking 
place over the next two days are as apt as they are timely. They 
are apt in the context of the general recognition by developing 
countries of the need to diversify and expand their export bases. 
They are. timely in the sense that many of the developing countries 
are currently considering these, matters. But the timeliness of 
these discussions extends bqyond the currency of technical 
considerations into the realm of the active dialogue within the 
region (most pointedly within CARICOM) on the mechanisms that could 
be used for expanding intraregional trade.
Mr. chairman, any attempt to determine the strategy for 
diversification of the regional production and export bases should 
include an examination of:
1. The possibilities for maximizing linkages among our 
economies;
2. The rules of origin we adopt among, ourselves; and
3. The tariff regime we employ vis-a-vis third countries.
With respect to 2 and 3, I am happy to note that CARICOM has 
already had a series of technical discussions and that in May of 
this year a special council meeting* will be held for the purpose 
of decision-making. Without in any way attempting to pre-empt the 
conclusions of that special meeting, 1 wish to express the opinion 
that we should place the highest possible priority on facilitation 
and encouragement of intra regional trade as well as on the 
deepening of the industrialization process within our region.
I
In so far' as maximizing economic linkages is concerned 
facilitating and promotional mechanisms have been formalized within 
CARICOM and there is no reason why the principles enshrined 
therein could not be applied in the broader sub-region on an agreed 
basis.
It is my vie vi Mr. Chairman that the fullest possible 
cooperat-ion intraregionally with the objective of sustained 
regional economic development is consistent with the position of 
t in .inlet national community in -Lius regard and with the view of 
the devaJoped countries that we should promote self-help measures.
We icoocjnize, however, that intraregional action is not a 
ruffioient condition for ensuring the diversification and expansion 
of our export bases. We need always to strive for ever increasing 
access to the markets of third countries and we will for some time 
.into the iuture need capital and other goods from third countries. 
Such polides as we adopt intraregionally therefore must also take 
in account', these objective conditions.
■J'b ' h r  m e a s u r e s  we t a k e  a r e  s u c c e s s f u l , í nev« t h e  c e s u i t a n t  
in u r e a s e o  p r o d u c t io n  an d  e x p o r t  a v a i l  a b i l i t y  wi 1 I n e e d  t o  b e 
m a r k e t e d  an d  we w i l l  h a v e  t o  b e  v e r y  i n n o v a t i v e  i n  a d o p t in g  
m eobuni sms t o  t h i s  e n d . I n  f a c t  t h e r e  i s  not: n e c e s s a r i l y  a
se g u e n c .iw  1 r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  m e a s u r e s  a n d  m e c n a n is m s . som e may 
a r g u e  o ru i.  t h e r e  i s  a lm o s t  a ¿ s y m b io t ic  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  T h e  b o tto m  
U n o ,  i r  o . v e r ,  i s  t h a t  no o n e  w i l l  p r o d u c e  g o o d s  w h ic h  lie  c a n n o t  
n o i l  s c  t h a t  t h e  m e a s u r e s  an d  m e c h a n ism  a r a  g e n e r a l l y  m u t u a l ly  
. r a in  f o r c i n g ,
d : unset trade • i.s one mechanism through which goods may be sold. 
ï r e - a r.M.:u fortunate to receive a copy of the document: which will 
be before, the participants at this meeting on I he subject and, in 
my opinion, it gives a good presentation of the pros and cons of 
counter-trade. It would therefore be superfluous foe me to attempt
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to repeat what is in the document though I would like to offer some 
comments on the subject.
I would think that it is generally agreed that the most 
efficient mechanism for conducting external trade transactions is 
through normal commercial arrangements such as letters of credit, 
lines of credit, etc. However, it is not always possible to 
dispose of products under such "traditional" arrangements. Hence 
countertrade as an option may need to be considered. 
Unfortunately, except perhaps in fairly recent times, countertrade 
has been perceived in a rather prejorative context and deemed to 
be almost undesirable in itself. i^This may well have prevented an 
objective assessment of this mechanism in situations where it could 
have been helpful. However, when the international liquidity 
crisis made it difficult for many developed countries to conduct 
trade on the established basis, they very quickly adopted the 
mechanism of countertrade and developed it, not merely into an 
acceptable instrument, but into a very sophisticated, and sometimes 
complex, one.
It is my sincere conviction that there is no prior reason for 
ruling out countertrade as a possible mechanism for executing 
transactions, expecially since in some cases it may be the only 
way to gain access to some markets and in other cases it may be a 
useful device to ensure exports of products which may not otherwise 
materialize.
As with all instruments for executing trade transactions, care 
needs to be exercised in concluding and executing transactions 
under a regime of countertrade and I am sure these will emerge in 
the course of your discussions.
The consultations will have been worth the effort even if at 
the end the only common position that emerged was that countertrade 
could have a useful role to play as we in the region strive to 
promote exports to third countries and to expand intraregional 
trade.
II have noted that the other area you propose to discuss is 
co-operation among state-trading organizations. As with
countertrade, the role of state trading organizations has generally 
been seen in negative terms but there could be no prior basis for 
such prejudice. It would be difficult to sustain a line of 
reasoning which suggests tĥ at the existence of- state trading 
organizations is in itself prejudicial to the expansion of intra- 
regional trade in particular or to international trade in general. 
To say this is not to deny the possibility of action by state 
trading organizations not fully consistent with the promotion of 
intraregional trade. I have always believed that more of our 
efforts should be expended in the direction of ensuring the 
efficiency of state trading organizations where they exist, of
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subjecting them to the competitive process and of ensuring they 
facilitate the achievement of intraregional objectives.
The item on this subject I observe is entitled "co-operation 
among state trading organizations". I hope that this rather 
limited caption would not preclude, or put another way, would 
include possibilities for discussions on the role of state trading 
organizations and competition between state trading organizations 
in our economies. This will to my mind be very useful since, in 
the final analysis, what Governments are interested in is the most 
efficient system of conducting trade which will maximize the net 
earnings for our individual economies specifically and for the 
regional economy generally.
It is against that background that I hope your discussions 
will take place and I urge ¡you to discuss in an open and frank 
manner, albeit cordially, so that by the end of the consultations 
each participant will leave better informed than when he or she 
arrived.
And I wish to thank the sponsors for providing me this 
opportunity to share some thoughts with you.
Thank you very much.
Secretary-General of CARICOM, 
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1. Countertrade Policies and Practices with special reference to 
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